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In Lenz v. Universal, the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of California ruled that copyright holders must 
consider fair use before filing takedown notices for infringing 
content posted on the internet. In the case, Stephanie Lenz uploaded 
a home video to YouTube of her children dancing to Prince's song 
"Let's Go Crazy.” In response, Universal Music Corporation 
submitted a takedown notice to YouTube pursuant to the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”), claiming that Lenz's home 
video violated its copyright in the song. Lenz claimed fair use of the 
copyrighted material and sued Universal for misrepresentation of a 
DMCA claim. In a decision rejecting a motion to dismiss the claim, 
the District Court held that Universal must consider fair use before 
filing a takedown notice, but noted that in order to prevail on a 
misrepresentation claim, a claimant would need to show bad faith 
by the copyright holder who filed the takedown notice. On 
September 14, 2015, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court. 
The Ninth Circuit’s opinion could have long-lasting effects on fair 
use and how copyright holders submit DMCA takedown notices. 
 
  
                                                                                                             
* Kiran K. Jassal, University of Washington School of Law, Class of 2017. For 
their valuable comments, I am grateful to Professor Robert W. Gomulkiewicz 
and the editors of the Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts. 
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Websites consisting of user-generated content allow users to 
upload material that they create. Sometimes user-generated content 
can contain elements of copyrighted works.1 Common examples 
include copyrighted music playing in the background of a blog or 
used as a soundtrack in a home video.2 In situations like these, it is 
not uncommon that user-generated content creators are unaware that 
they may be violating copyright law. Thus, these creators might be 
                                                                                                             
1 See Scott Karp, A Lot of User-Generated Content is Really User-Appropriated 
Content, PUBLISHING 2.0, Nov. 18, 2006, http:// 
publishing2.com/2006/11/18/a-lot-of-user-generated-content-is-really-user-
appropriated-content/. 
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surprised that under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
(“DMCA”), copyright owners may request that websites, like 
YouTube, remove copyright infringing material through issuance of 
a takedown notice.3 In some instances, however, user-generated 
content creators’ use of a third-party work may constitute fair use, 
and therefore a takedown notice would be inappropriate. The Ninth 
Circuit’s decision in Lenz v. Universal4 now requires copyright 
holders to engage in a fair use analysis before submitting a takedown 
notice. In light of this ruling, user-generated content websites may 
notice a decrease in the volume of takedown notice requests they 
receive from alleged copyright holders.  
This Article proposes that clear, objective standards be put in 
place that a copyright holder must satisfy to file a takedown notice. 
Part I provides background on user-generated content websites, the 
DMCA, and the fair use doctrine. Part II summarizes case law in 
this area and the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Lenz v. Universal. Finally, 
Part III analyzes the ruling’s potential impact and proposes an 
amendment to the DMCA, namely a standard form that would 
ensure copyright holders adequately assess fair use before filing for 




A.  User-Generated Content 
 
User-generated content is any type of content that has been 
created and made available by unpaid contributors.5 It can refer to 
pictures, videos, testimonials, tweets, blog posts, and everything in 
between. Commonly used user-generated content websites include 
YouTube, Facebook, and Wikipedia.6 Over the last decade, 
individuals and businesses have increasingly moved their personal 
and professional activity to the virtual realm. This has led to a 
largely unmonitored exchange of information, products, and other 
                                                                                                             
3 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006). 
4 Lenz, supra note 2. 
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communications. As individuals and businesses seek avenues to 
share their personal and professional endeavors on the internet, 
particularly on user-generated blogs, forums, and websites, the risks 
and responsibilities associated with these activities must be well 
understood in order to avoid potential copyright infringements. 
Unfortunately, the informal practices associated with creating, 
uploading, and sharing user-generated content may leave both 
copyright holders and potentially infringing content creators 
wondering what exactly their rights are. 
 
B.  Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
 
The DMCA was a congressional effort attempting to balance 
“the interests of content owners, service providers, and information 
users in a way that will foster the continued development of 
electronic commerce and the growth of the internet.”7 Congress 
designed the DMCA to “enlist the cooperation of internet and other 
online service providers to combat ongoing copyright 
infringement.”8 As a result, the Act provides various injunctive and 
monetary remedies for copyright holders who claim infringement.9 
When considering injunctive relief, courts look at factors such as the 
magnitude of harm the copyright holder is likely to suffer if the 
material is not removed and whether an injunction is feasible, 
effective, and less burdensome than other available remedies.10 In 
order to seek injunctive relief under the DMCA, copyright owners 
must first follow the notice and takedown provisions.11 Perhaps 
most importantly, the DMCA requires a “statement that the 
complaining party has a good faith belief that use of the material in 
the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, 
its agent, or the law.”12  
 
                                                                                                             
7 H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 21 (1998). 
8 Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass’n of America Inc., 391 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir. 
2004). 
9 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006). 
10 17 U.S.C. § 512(j)(2)(A)–(D). 
11 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3). 
12 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v). 
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1. Safe Harbor Provisions 
 
To elicit compliance from service providers, the DMCA offers 
a “safe harbor” provision insulating these parties from monetary 
liability associated with copyright infringement activities by third-
parties.13 The DMCA safe harbor provisions define “service 
provider” as “a provider of online services or network access, or the 
operator of facilities therefor,” including “an entity offering the 
transmission, routing, or providing of connections for digital online 
communications, between or among points specified by a user, of 
material of the user's choosing, without modification to the content 
of the material as sent or received.”14 As one pair of commentators 
has noted, this definition “would seem to encompass virtually every 
internet or intranet provider or intermediary, including portal sites, 
search engines, universities, and intranet providers.”15 Within this 
broad definition, the DMCA safe harbor provisions distinguish 
among different types of service providers based on the function 
they are performing.16  
Understanding the role and function of every possible entity that 
could be classified as a service provider is not necessary for this 
Article. However, it is important to recognize that the DMCA safe 
harbor provisions cover a wide range of entities that have different 
types of relationships with alleged copyright infringers. For 
example, service providers responsible for hosting websites will 
generally have a direct subscription relationship with alleged 
infringers. Search engines, however, often lack any direct 
relationship with parties responsible for posting allegedly infringing 
materials. Recognizing these distinctions is essential to properly 
analyzing the application of the DMCA safe harbor provisions. 
In order to claim protection under the DMCA’s safe harbor 
                                                                                                             
13 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1). 
14 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1). 
15 Jonathan Band & Matthew Schruers, Safe Harbors Against the Liability 
Hurricane: The Communications Decency Act and the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 295, 303–04 (2002). 
16 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)–(d). 
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provision, content hosts must meet at least three requirements.17 
First, the service provider must have “adopted and reasonably 
implemented . . . a policy that provides for the termination in 
appropriate circumstances of subscribers and account holders of the 
service provider's system or network who are repeat infringers.”18 
Second, the service provider must have informed “subscribers and 
account holders of the service provider's system or network” of such 
policy.19 Third, such policy must accommodate and not interfere 
with “standard technical measures.”20 Once these initial eligibility 
requirements are fulfilled, service providers must then look to the 
subsections applicable to their particular functions for additional 
requirements. 
 
2. Counter Notification Procedures 
 
The DMCA safe harbor provisions also contain a detailed set of 
counter-notification procedures.21 Section 512(g)(1) limits liability 
to any party based on the service providers' “good faith” removal of 
“material or activity claimed to be infringing or based on facts or 
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent, regardless 
of whether the material or activity is ultimately determined to be 
infringing.”22 Section 512(g)(2) provides an exception to this 
general limitation by requiring service providers to follow counter-
notification procedures in order to benefit from a limitation of their 
liability resulting from removal of materials. Under this section, a 
service provider can still be held liable for removal of “material 
residing at the direction of a subscriber of the service provider on a 
system or network controlled or operated by or for the service 
provider” unless the service provider fulfills three requirements.23 
First, the service provider must take “reasonable steps promptly to 
notify the subscriber that it has removed or disabled access to the 
                                                                                                             
17 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)–(C). 
18 17 U.S.C.  § 512(i)(1)(A). 
19 Id. 
20 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(B). 
21 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(2) 
22 17 U.S.C.  § 512(g)(1). 
23 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(2). 
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material.”24 Second, upon receipt of a counter-notification from the 
subscriber, the service provider must provide the original 
complainant with a copy of the counter-notification and a warning 
that it will replace the material in ten business days.25 Finally, the 
service provider must replace the material, within ten to fourteen 
days after receipt of the counter-notification, unless the original 
complainant notifies the service provider that it has filed “an action 
seeking a court order to restrain the subscriber from engaging in 
infringing activity relating to the material on the service provider's 
system or network.”26 
Unfortunately, the DMCA provides few explicit protections for 
content creators or users. The only key provision protecting users is 
17 U.S.C. §512(f), which holds a copyright owner liable for 
knowingly misrepresenting an infringement claim. Accordingly, the 
DMCA states that “[a]ny person who knowingly materially 
misrepresents under this section—that that material or activity is 
infringing… shall be liable for any damages.27 
 
C.  Fair Use Doctrine 
 
“Fair use” is a flexible doctrine that allows for the use of 
copyrighted works without permission or payment in certain, 
socially beneficial instances. The Copyright Act of 1976  
(“Copyright Act”) does not list types of works that qualify as fair 
use; rather, it provides a framework which courts apply to the facts 
of a particular case.28 First, a court will consider whether the work 
at issue falls within one of the specified uses, such as criticism, 
comment, news reporting, or teaching; however, this consideration 
is not determinative.29 Essentially, a favored use may not qualify as 
fair use and a use outside the aforementioned categories may 
nevertheless be fair use. Next, courts are required to consider four 
factors: (1) the purpose and character of the use, (2) the nature of the 
                                                                                                             
24 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(2)(A). 
25 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(2)(B). 
26 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(2)(C). 
27 17 U.S.C. § 512(f)(1). 
28 17 U.S.C. § 107 
29 17 U.S.C. § 107(a). 
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copyrighted work, (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion 
used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole, and (4) the 
effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work.30 
Fair use is a notoriously challenging doctrine to apply because 
the Copyright Act provides little guidance on what weight to give 
the various factors. A leading case, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 
shows how fact-specific the analysis can be while determining 
whether 2Live Crew’s rap parody version of Roy Orbison’s song 
“Pretty Woman” constituted fair use.31 The U.S. District Court for 
the Middle District of Tennessee granted summary judgment for the 
rap group based on the unique comedic character of the work and 
the quantity taken from the original song.32 On appeal, however, the 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit rejected the rap group’s fair 
use defense based on the parody’s commercial nature and the 
quantity taken from the original song.33 Ultimately, the Supreme 
Court of the United States reversed and remanded for a more 
nuanced analysis.34 The Court found that a parody must borrow 
from an original work in order to provide commentary and that the 
amount borrowed in this case was no more than necessary.35 
Because fair use is so fact-specific, it can be difficult for parties to 
decide whether a potential use is considered fair use without 
litigation. 
 
II. CASE LAW 
 
A.  Leading up to Lenz 
Several cases illustrate how courts have subsequently treated 
§512 of the DMCA. These cases help elucidate the holding in Lenz 
v. Universal. 
 
                                                                                                             
30 Id. 
31 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 US 569 (1994). 
32 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 754 F. Supp. 1150 (M.D. Tenn 1991). 
33 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 972 F.2d 1429 (6th Cir. 1992). 




Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts, Vol. 12, Iss. 4 [2017], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjlta/vol12/iss4/3
2017] “LET’S GO CRAZY” WITH FAIR USE 489 
 
1. Online Policy Group v. Diebold 
 
In Online Policy Group v. Diebold,36 the U.S. District Court of 
the Northern District of California held that the copyright holder, 
Diebold, Inc., had violated the DMCA by sending a false takedown 
notification.37 Diebold manufactured electronic voting machines. 
Prior to this suit, internal company emails expressing concerns about 
security issues with the voting machines were leaked and posted on 
the internet.38 Subsequently, an online newspaper used the emails in 
an article criticizing Diebold.39 Diebold issued a takedown notice to 
the online newspaper’s ISP, Online Policy Group (“OPG”). In 
response, OPG sued Diebold for knowingly misrepresenting a 
copyright infringement claim.40 Diebold never produced specific 
emails that contained copyrighted content and even admitted that 
some emails were publishable under fair use.41 Accordingly, the 
court held that Diebold had knowingly misrepresented infringing 
activity by sending the takedown notification. In its holding, the 
court examined the meaning of a “knowing misrepresentation” 
under §512(f): “’knowing means that a party actually knew [or] 
should have known if it acted with reasonable care or diligence, or 
would have had no substantial doubt had it been acting in good faith, 
that it was making misrepresentations.”42 Since some emails were 
“clearly subject to the fair use exception,” and Diebold had admitted 
this, it was simple for the court to conclude that Diebold knew it was 





                                                                                                             
36 Online Policy Group v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195 (N.D. Cal 2004). 
37 Id. at 1203. 
38 Id. at 1197. 
39 Id. at 1197–98. 
40 Id. at 1198. 
41 Online, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 1203. 
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2. Rossi v. Motion Picture Association of America 
 
Rossi v. Motion Picture Association of America44 was the first 
case that directly addressed the nebulous “good faith belief” 
language in the DMCA. In affirming the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Hawaii’s grant of summary judgment for the copyright 
owner, the Ninth Circuit held that only a subjective standard, not an 
objective reasonableness standard, is required to determine whether 
an alleged copyright owner sufficiently examined whether issuing a 
takedown notice is appropriate.45 In this case, Michael Rossi’s ISP, 
responding to a takedown notification from the Motion Picture 
Association of America (“MPAA”), shut down Rossi’s website.46 
The MPAA believed that the site was distributing copyrighted 
movies illegally because the site provided links that teased viewers 
into thinking that they could view copyrighted material.47 However, 
no movies were actually available to view. Rossi argued that the 
MPAA “did not have sufficient information to form a good faith 
belief.”48 More specifically, he asserted that the MPAA could not 
have formed a good faith belief that his website was infringing 
copyrighted works without clicking on and accessing the suspicious 
links.49 Good faith belief, Rossi argued, should include a reasonable 
investigation of the website.50 
 The court held that the MPAA only needed to meet a 
subjective standard before sending its takedown notification for 
several reasons.51 First, it determined, federal statutes use subjective 
good faith and objective reasonableness as distinct standards. 
Congress would not have written “good faith” in the statute if it had 
meant “reasonable belief.”52 Second, the liability section of the 
DMCA, §512(f), states that damages may be imposed only if the 
copyright holder knowingly and materially misrepresents activities 
                                                                                                             
44 Rossi v. Motion Picture of Ass’n of Am., Inc., 391 F. 3d 1000 (9th Cir. 2004). 
45 Id. at 1007. 
46 Id. at 1001–02. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 1002. 
49 Rossi, 391 F. 3d at 1003. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 1004. 
 
10
Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts, Vol. 12, Iss. 4 [2017], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjlta/vol12/iss4/3
2017] “LET’S GO CRAZY” WITH FAIR USE 491 
cited in the takedown notification.53 Knowing misrepresentation 
was incompatible with Rossi’s suggested reasonableness standard; 
a belief could be unreasonable without being a knowing 
misrepresentation that triggered liability under §512(f).54 Such a 
result would render the good faith belief requirement in §512(c) 
meaningless. Third, the court held that it would be unfair to make 
copyright owners liable simply because an unknowing mistake is 
made.55 Applying the subjective good faith standard, the Ninth 
Circuit examined information on Rossi’s website and the MPAA’s 
subsequent actions. Ultimately, the court ruled that Rossi failed to 
raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding MPAA's violation of 
the DMCA.56 The Rossi opinion concludes with a reminder that 
Congress intended to protect internet users accused of infringement 
from “subjectively improper actions by copyright holders.”57 
 
3. Dudnikov v. MGA Entertainment 
 
In Dudnikov v. MGA Entertainment, the U.S. District Court of 
Colorado granted summary judgement for the copyright holder 
MGA Entertainment (“MGA”) on the plaintiff’s knowing 
misrepresentation claim.58 The plaintiffs, Karen Dudnikov and 
Michael Meadors, were selling fleece hats on eBay bearing a 
copyright-protected applique of a ‘Bratz’ character.59 MGA held 
copyright and trademark rights in the Bratz characters and, on 
discovering the plaintiff’s eBay auction, sent a notification to eBay 
to have the sale stopped.60 The plaintiffs sued, claiming MGA 
ignored “copyright law in an attempt to control the on-line auction 
                                                                                                             
53 17 U.S.C. § 512(f) (2006) (“Any person who knowingly materially 
misrepresents under this section that materially or activity is infringing…shall 
be liable for any damages, including costs and attorneys’ fees, incurred by the 
alleged infringer, by any copyright owner or copyright owner’s authorized 
licensee, or by a service provider.”). 
54 Rossi, 391 F.3d at 1004–05. 
55 Id. at 1005. 
56 Id.  
57 Id.  
58 Dudnikov v. MGA Entm’t, Inc., 410 F. Supp. 2d 1010 (D. Colo. 2005). 
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market.”61 They further asserted that they were entitled by fair use 
and the first-sale-doctrine to sell the fleece hats.62  
The court applied the subjective good-faith standard established 
in Rossi,63 holding that “the Rossi decision [is] on point with regard 
to the salient issue in this case: whether MGA was entitled, based 
on its good-faith belief that infringement was occurring, to terminate 
the eBay auction of plaintiff’s fleece hat.”64 The court ultimately 
found that MGA acted with good faith and was entitled to have the 
sale stopped.65 Upon, the plaintiffs’ allegation of perjury, the court 
imposed the burden of proof on the plaintiffs to support their claim 
with “substantial evidence”66 Subsequently, the plaintiffs were 
unable to raise a genuine issue of fact and lost on summary 
judgment.67 
 
B.  Lenz v. Universal 
 
In Lenz v. Universal, plaintiff Stephanie Lenz contended that her 
use of Prince’s song “Let’s Go Crazy” constituted fair use and that 
copyright holders cannot make a good faith infringement claim, as 
required by the DMCA, “without considering all authorized uses of 
the material, including fair use.”68 Lenz further declared that 
copyright holders should make a fact-specific determination before 
filing takedown notices.69 In opposition, Universal argued that it 
should not have to evaluate fair use before submitting a takedown 
notice because it would “lose the ability to respond rapidly to 
potential infringements.”70 Universal additionally claimed that “fair 
use is merely an excused infringement to a copyright rather than a 
use authorized by a copyright owner or by law.”71 
                                                                                                             
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Dudnikov, 410 F. Supp. 2d at 1012. 
64 Id. at 1017. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 1012. 
67 Dudnikov, 410 F. Supp. 2d at 1013. 
68 Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1154 (N.D. Cal. 2008). 
69 Id. at 1154–55. 
70 Id. at 1155. 
71 Id. at 1154. 
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1. Case Facts 
 
In 2007, Stephanie Lenz posted a twenty-nine second clip of her 
children dancing to Prince’s song on YouTube.72 In response, 
Universal, the copyright holder for “Let’s Go Crazy”, sent YouTube 
a takedown notice, allegedly in compliance with the DMCA 
requirements.73 Shortly thereafter, Lenz sent YouTube a counter-
notification, claiming fair use of the original work and requesting 
the video be reposted.74 Six weeks later, YouTube reposted Lenz’s 
video.75 Still dissatisfied with the takedown of her home video, Lenz 
sued Universal for misrepresentation under the DMCA and sought 
a declaration from the U.S. District Court for the Northern District 
of California that her use of the copyrighted song was non-
infringing.76 According to the DMCA, the copyright holder must 
consider whether use of the material was allowed by the copyright 
owner or the law.77 Before YouTube removed Lenz’s video, 
Universal released a statement regarding their intention to remove 
all user-generated content involving Prince from the internet as a 
matter of principle.78 Based on Universal’s statements, Lenz argued 
that Universal was issuing takedown notices in bad faith, as they 
were attempting to remove all Prince-related content rather than 
considering whether each posting violated copyright law. Had 
Universal truly considered whether Lenz’s video infringed on its 
copyright, Lenz contended that Universal would have clearly noted 
that her video was a fair use. Universal expressed concerns over 
conducting an intensive investigation when determining whether a 
potentially infringing use falls under the general “fair use” doctrine.  
 
2. Lenz Court’s Reasoning 
 
                                                                                                             
72 Id. at 1152. 




77 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v). 
78 Lenz, 572 F. Supp. 2d at 1153. 
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Both parties’ main arguments can be summarized neatly. 
Universal contended that copyright owners cannot be required to 
evaluate the question of fair use prior to sending a takedown notice 
because fair use is merely an excused infringement of a copyright 
rather than a use authorized by the owner or by law. In opposition, 
Lenz argued that fair use is an authorized use of copyrighted 
material, noting that the fair use doctrine itself is an express 
component of copyright law. In essence, Lenz asserted that 
copyright owners cannot represent in good faith that material 
infringes a copyright without considering all authorized uses of the 
material, including fair use. 
The parties did not dispute that Lenz used copyrighted material 
in her video or whether Universal is the true owner of Prince’s 
music. Rather, the question in this case was whether the DMCA 
requires a copyright owner to consider the fair use doctrine in 
formulating a good faith belief that use of the material in the manner 
complained of is not “authorized” by the copyright owner, its agent, 
or the law.79 If so, copyright holders are required to weigh the four 
fair use factors, or else they are liable for misrepresentation. 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s ruling 
that copyright owners must consider fair use before submitting 
DMCA takedown notices.80 In formulating their ruling, the court 
used statutory interpretation to determine the scope of what is 
considered “authorized.” The Copyright Act itself does not define 
the term “authorize” or “unauthorized.” However, Black’s Law 
Dictionary defines “authorize” as “empowers; to formally 
approve.”81 As such, the court determined that “[b]ecause [the 
Copyright Act] both ‘empowers’ and ‘formally approves’ the use of 
copyrighted material if the use constitutes fair use, fair use is 
considered to be ‘authorized by law’ within the meaning of §512(c)” 
of the DMCA.”82 The court held that the DMCA already required 
copyright holders to make an initial review of the potentially 
infringing material prior to sending a takedown notice, and that it 
would be impossible to meet any of the requirements of §512(c) 
                                                                                                             
79 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v). 
80 Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 801 F.3d 1126, 1129 (9th Cir. 2015). 
81 Authorize, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
82 Lenz, 801 F.3d at 1132. 
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without doing so.83 Considering the applicability of the fair use 
doctrine is a part of that initial review.84 In order to comply with the 
DMCA, a copyright holder’s consideration of fair use need not be 
searching or intensive.85 The court stated that it was mindful of the 
work this presents, but that work “does not excuse a failure to 
comply with the procedures outlined by Congress.”86 Moreover, the 
court noted that the implementation of computer algorithms to 
notify copyright owners of potential infringements online appears to 
be a valid and good-faith middle ground for processing a plethora of 
content while still meeting the DMCA’s requirements to somehow 
consider fair use.87 Computer programs may be relied upon when 
they sufficiently meet the following standards: “(1) the video track 
matches the video track of a copyrighted work submitted by a 
content owner; (2) the audio track matched the audio track of that 
same copyrighted work; or (3) nearly the entirety….is comprised of 
a single copyrighted work.”88 
 
III. LENZ’S IMPACT AND AMENDING THE DMCA 
 
A.  A Step in the Right Direction 
 
The DMCA’s safe harbor provisions arguably incentivizes 
overzealous removal of user-generated content by service providers. 
Under the notice and takedown procedures, if a service provider 
receives notification from a copyright owner alleging copyright 
infringement, it can initially take one of two actions. The provider 
can elect to remove or disable access to the allegedly infringing 
content. If it does so, it is protected from contributory liability by 
the safe harbor provisions.89 Alternatively, a service provider can 
                                                                                                             
83 Id at 1135. 
84 Id. 
85 See Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass’n of Am. Inc., 391 F.3d 1000, 1004 (9th Cir. 
2004). 
86 Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 801 F.3d 1126, 1135 (9th Cir. 2015). 
87 Id. 
88 Id. (citing Fair Use Principles for User Generated Video Content, 
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, https://www.eff.org/fr/pages/fair-use-
principles-user-generated-video-content (last visited April 28, 2017)). 
89 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(1). 
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refuse to remove or disable access, in which case it is unprotected 
by the safe harbor provisions and opens itself up to potential 
secondary liability. In weighing the merits of a takedown notice 
complaint and determining whether to provide an alleged copyright 
holder with relief, the service provider acts in a similar capacity to 
that of a judiciary; however, unlike the courts, service providers 
have a direct financial incentive tilting them in favor of removing 
the allegedly infringing content. 
The Lenz opinion does not change the safe harbor procedures for 
service providers or host websites that receive takedown notices; 
however, it may affect the quality and volume of notices received, 
depending on how copyright holders and their agents adjust. Lenz v. 
Universal effectively put copyright holders on notice to exert a good 
faith effort in examining whether a potentially infringing work 
legally uses the original work, and this good faith effort must include 
a fair use analysis. 
The fair use doctrine gives little guidance about what weight to 
give the four factors laid out in the Copyright Act. Because the 
doctrine is so fact-specific, it is understandably difficult for 
copyright owners with little to no legal background to meet this 
expectation. Limited understanding of case law may impact the 
volume of notices ISPs and host websites receive. For instance, the 
penalties associated with misrepresentation may cause copyright 
owners to err on the side of caution and refrain from filing for 
takedown notices with host websites.90 While it is too early to have 
a clear picture of the impact, Lenz v. Universal will likely dissuade 
frivolous takedown notices for the time being.  
 
B.  Standard-Form Proposal 
 
In retrospect, it is easy to see how Universal could believe that 
Lenz had infringed their copyrighted work. The title of Lenz’s 
video, “’Let’s Go Crazy’ #1”, is nearly identical to the title of 
Prince’s song. However, large corporations, like Universal, have 
extensive resources that should afford them at least a cursory 
investigation into potential infringement of their copyright portfolio. 
If Universal was compelled to use an objective good faith standard, 
                                                                                                             
90 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(f). 
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it would have quickly realized that a short video clip of a toddler 
dancing to faint background music of Prince’s song does not 
constitute copyright infringement. A subjective good faith standard 
would make it easier for Universal and other large media-producing 
corporations to issue takedown notices without pausing to consider 
the content at issue. 
When a copyright holder alleges infringement, courts have 
applied the fair use doctrine as a guideline to decide permissible 
uses.91 Likewise, Congress can integrate into the DMCA a standard 
form for use by all internet service providers and user-generated 
content websites, which details the fair use doctrine factors and 
explicitly requires those who allege copyright infringement to 
establish sufficient grounds based on the facts of their individual 
case for filing a takedown notice. A standard form has the potential 
to assist copyright owners in separating fair use of copyrighted 
works from obvious copyright violations. Moreover, such a 
framework would further curb the number of frivolous takedown 
notices, protect content creators from having their work taken down, 
and protect parties ranging from independent copyright owners who 
lack legal aid to large corporations from being sued for 
misrepresentation when filing for a DMCA takedown notice. A 
sample form is provided on the following page. 
 
                                                                                                             
91 See generally Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 US 417 
(1984); see also Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Ent., 471 US 539 (1983). 
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Name:        Address: 
Title:        City, State, Zip Code: 
Company (If applicable):     Phone/ Email: 
 
 
Copyrighted Work:      Infringing Content: 
Relation to Copyrighted Work:      










Fair Use Analysis 
Pursuant to 17 U.S. Code § 107, the following factors must be considered when determining whether use of a 
copyrighted work constitutes a fair use. Please address these factors in the space provided. 
(1) The purpose and character of the use  
 
(2) The nature of the copyrighted work 
 
(3) The amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole 
 




✓ Under penalty of perjury I certify that the information contained in this notification is accurate, and I have 
the authority to act on behalf of the owner of the copyright(s) involved. 
         __________________________ 
         (Signature/ Date) 
Upload Attachment(s) 
 
(i.e. whether the infringing use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit purposes) 
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CONCLUSION 
Lenz v. Universal built upon precedent by effectively putting 
copyright holders on notice that in order to exert a good faith effort 
in examining whether a potentially infringing work legally uses the 
original work, a fair use analysis must be conducted. While Lenz 
represents a step in the right direction, opportunities for clarification 
exist that have the potential to benefit copyright holders as well as 
user-generated content creators who make use of copyrighted 
material. One such opportunity is to amend the DMCA to include a 
standard form that would be adopted by all ISPs and host websites. 
This simple amendment would provide clarity to all parties and help 




▪ Copyright owners and their agents must engage in a fair use 
analysis before submitting a takedown notice. 
▪ Computer algorithms used to notify copyright owners of 
potential infringements online are a valid and good-faith 
mechanism for meeting the DMCA’s requirements. Such 
programs may be relied upon when they sufficiently meet 
the following standards: “(1) the video track matches the 
video track of a copyrighted work submitted by a content 
owner; (2) the audio track matched the audio track of that 
same copyrighted work; or (3) nearly the entirety….is 
comprised of a single copyrighted work.”92 
▪ Lenz. v. Universal does not change the safe harbor 
procedures for service providers or host websites that receive 
takedown notices. 
 
                                                                                                             
92 Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 801 F.3d 1126, 1129 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing 
Fair Use Principles for User Generated Video Content, ELECTRONIC 
FRONTIER FOUNDATION, https://www.eff.org/fr/pages/fair-use-principles-
user-generated-video-content (last visited April 28, 2017)). 
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